FINAL REPORT TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Evaluation of the Need for Continued Regulation of Certain Professions and Occupations as Recommended by the Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission

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Summary
The Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission (JLARC) recommended that the Board for Professional and Occupational Regulation (BPOR) review the need for continued regulation of certain professions and occupations. The purpose of this report is to:

1. determine the appropriate level of regulation, if any, for currently licensed soil scientists, waste management facility operators, and landscape architects, and
2. evaluate potential impacts of deregulation on currently certified common interest community manager employees, interior designers, backflow prevention device workers, and wetland delineators.

After assessing those programs against the statutory criteria enumerated in § 54.1-311 of the Code of Virginia to inform its analysis, BPOR offers the following findings and recommendations.

Key Findings + Recommendations
Assessment of the need for continued regulation
Soil Scientists
- Certification of soil scientists, rather than licensing, appears to be the least-restrictive degree of regulation necessary to protect the public.
- The General Assembly may wish to consider reverting to the system of voluntary certification (title protection) that existed prior to 2013.
- If deregulated, national certification could serve as a substitute for state regulation.

Waste Management Facility Operators
- State occupational regulation of waste management facility operators is not warranted.
- The General Assembly may wish to consider eliminating the licensing program, and rely instead on existing facility oversight by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality.
- If deregulated, national certifications could serve as a substitute for state regulation.

Landscape Architects
- Licensure of landscape architects appears justified as the least-restrictive degree of regulation necessary to protect the public.
- If landscape architects are deregulated, there is no substitute for state regulation.
- To address concerns about risk from unregulated occupations performing similar work under the existing regulatory system, the General Assembly may wish to consider reserving aspects of the scope of practice only to licensed professionals.

Assessment of potential impact of decertification
Common Interest Community Manager Employees
- The General Assembly may wish to consider eliminating the certification program, because state occupational regulation of CIC manager employees is not warranted.
- National certifications could serve as a substitute for state regulation.
• If deregulated, current certificate holders would be relieved of the obligation to pay a $75 fee every two years to renew their state credential.
• Compliance costs associated with national certifications include annual fees ranging from $85-385 and completion of up to 16 hours of continuing education as a condition of renewal.

**Interior Designers**
• Certification of interior designers appears justified as the least-restrictive degree of regulation necessary to protect the public.
• National certification could serve as a substitute for state regulation. However, deregulation may result in economic disruption for current certificate holders who would need to hire consulting licensed professionals to stamp their work, at increased cost to their businesses and clients.
• If deregulated, current certified interior designers would be relieved of the obligation to pay a $45 fee every two years to renew their state credential.
• Compliance costs associated with national certification include a $75 annual fee and completion of six hours of continuing education every two years.

**Backflow Prevention Device Workers**
• Certification of backflow prevention device workers appears warranted as the least-restrictive degree of regulation necessary to protect the public.
• Relying on national or local certifications as alternatives to state regulation will increase compliance burden on current certificate holders, particularly for those who work in more than one locality.
• If deregulated, current certified backflow prevention device workers would be relieved of the obligation to complete eight hours of continuing education and pay a $50 fee every two years to renew their state credential.
• Deregulation conflicts with impending Virginia Department of Health regulatory action that would mandate anyone who tests and repairs backflow prevention assemblies and devices be a DPOR-certified backflow prevention device worker.

**Wetland Delineators**
• Certification of wetland delineators appears justified as the least-restrictive degree of regulation necessary to protect the public.
• National certification is not an equivalent substitute for state regulation.
• If deregulated, current certified professional wetland delineators would be relieved of the obligation to pay a $70 fee every two years to renew their state credential.
• Compliance costs associated with national certification include a $75 annual fee, as well as a $100 renewal fee and completion of continuing education every five years.
Overview

In its 2018 report, *Operations and Performance of the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation*, JLARC found the vast majority of occupations assigned to the agency met Virginia’s statutory criteria to warrant regulation. In Chapter 2 of its report, JLARC noted:

The General Assembly decides which occupations are regulated by the Department of Professional and Occupational Regulation (DPOR). The decision to regulate an occupation should consider two priorities: the need to protect the public and the need to avoid placing unnecessary restrictions on individuals and businesses entering the workforce.

However, JLARC’s analysis determined several DPOR-regulated occupations either explicitly do not satisfy the criteria for regulation, or the current level of regulation is unnecessary because the public is otherwise sufficiently protected. For example, report recommendations 1 and 4 suggested the General Assembly take legislative action to eliminate regulation of natural gas automobile mechanics and technicians, common interest community managers; opticians; and residential building energy analysts and firms.1

Additionally, JLARC cited the statutory authority granted to the Board for Professional and Occupational Regulation (BPOR) to evaluate whether currently unregulated occupations should be regulated, noting that in the past the General Assembly often directed BPOR to review proposed and existing regulatory programs using the guidelines enumerated in § 54.1-311.

“Greater use of this evaluation process would help ensure the General Assembly is able to make fully informed decisions about which occupations should be regulated,” according to JLARC.

Purpose

JLARC recommended BPOR review the need for continued regulation of the following occupations, in accordance with the statutory evaluation process:

- Virginia licensed professional soil scientists
- Waste management facility operators
- Landscape architects
- Common interest community manager principal/supervisory employees
- Certified interior designers
- Backflow prevention device workers
- Virginia certified professional wetland delineators

The purpose of this report is to determine the appropriate level of regulation, if any, for soil scientists, waste management facility operators, and landscape architects; and to evaluate potential impacts of deregulation on currently certified common interest community manager employees, interior designers, backflow prevention device workers, and wetland delineators.

Methodology
BPOR initially developed study guidelines to document best practices and procedures used in prior evaluations. The guidance document is publicly available on the Virginia Regulatory Town Hall to inform interested parties of BPOR’s statutory authority and its approach toward conducting studies.\(^2\) In addition to data collection and analysis, the evaluation process solicits and encourages meaningful public participation from the public as well as regulated communities.

As part of this review, to complement its research and document review, BPOR staff interviewed program administrators, practitioners, representatives of professional associations, and other stakeholders. After issuing an interim report in December 2019,\(^3\) BPOR scheduled a series of regional public hearings to solicit comment as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>March 20, 2020</td>
<td>Richmond</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 2020</td>
<td>Harrisonburg</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 17, 2020</td>
<td>Abingdon</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 21, 2020</td>
<td>Chesapeake</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 27, 2020</td>
<td>Fairfax</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Unfortunately, the COVID-19 public health emergency required cancelation of all in-person public hearings. Given the uncertainty surrounding when public hearings might be rescheduled safely, and in order to provide interested parties sufficient opportunity to provide comment, BPOR opened a public comment forum on the Virginia Regulatory Town Hall from September 1 – 30, 2020.

BPOR received 980 comments in total, all of which are available for review at: https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/ViewNotice.cfm?GNid=1150.

Degrees of Regulation
Pursuant to § 54.1-311, if BPOR recommends a particular profession or occupation be regulated—or suggests a different level of regulation should be imposed on an already regulated profession or occupation—it shall consider the following degrees of regulation in order:

1. **Private civil actions and criminal prosecutions**
   Whenever existing common law and statutory causes of civil action or criminal prohibitions are not sufficient to eradicate existing harm or prevent potential harm, the Board may first consider the recommendation of statutory change to provide stricter causes for civil action and criminal prosecution.

2. **Inspection and injunction**
   Whenever current inspection and injunction procedures are not sufficient to eradicate existing harm, the Board may recommend more adequate inspection procedures and to specify procedures whereby the appropriate regulatory entity may enjoin an activity which is detrimental to the public well-being. The Board may recommend to the appropriate agency of the Commonwealth that such procedures be

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\(^2\) See https://townhall.virginia.gov/L/ViewGDoc.cfm?gdid=6036

\(^3\) See https://rga.lis.virginia.gov/Published/2019/RD695
strengthened or it may recommend statutory changes in order to grant the appropriate state agency the power to provide sufficient inspection and injunction procedures.

3. **Registration**
Whenever it is necessary to determine the impact of the operation of a profession or occupation on the public, the Board may recommend a system of registration.

4. **Certification**
When the public requires a substantial basis for relying on the professional services of a practitioner, the Board may recommend a system of certification.

5. **Licensing**
Whenever adequate regulation cannot be achieved by means other than licensing, the Board may recommend licensing procedures for any particular profession or occupation.

**Criteria**
In determining the proper degree of regulation, if any, BPOR shall determine the following:

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.
2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.
3. The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed.
4. Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population.
5. Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character and performance of each individual engaged in the profession or occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics.
6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that he has met minimum qualifications.
7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.
8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.
9. Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.
10. Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.
Alternatives to Regulation
In cases where BPOR identifies a potential risk from an unregulated profession or occupation, but other criteria are insufficient to substantiate a regulatory program of registration, certification, or licensure, it may make other recommendations.

In accordance with statute and Criteria 6 and 7, BPOR must consider less restrictive means to protect the public’s health, safety, and welfare, rather than interfering in the occupational property rights of individuals.

Evaluation Matrix
If an evaluation indicates that a regulatory program is warranted, BPOR assesses the criteria against the degrees of regulation, from least restrictive (registration) to most restrictive (licensure).

The following matrix outlines the characteristics of registration, certification, and licensure, and summarizes criteria applicable to each category.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGISTRATION</th>
<th>CERTIFICATION</th>
<th>LICENSURE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Requires only the filing of name, location, and occasionally additional information. Minimum competency standards are not typically required for a registry.</td>
<td>Voluntary; also known as &quot;title protection.&quot; No scope of practice reserved to a particular group. However, only those individuals who meet minimum competency standards may use or call themselves by the protected title.</td>
<td>Mandatory; most restrictive level of occupational regulation. Statutory scope of practice reserved to select group based on unique, identifiable, minimum competencies for public protection.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Risk</td>
<td>Low potential, but consumers need to know that redress is possible.</td>
<td>Moderate potential, attributable to the nature of the practice, consumer vulnerability, or practice setting and level of supervision.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Skill + Training</td>
<td>Variable, but can be differentiated from ordinary work and labor.</td>
<td>Specialized; can be differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autonomy</td>
<td>Variable.</td>
<td>Variable; some independent decision-making; majority of practice actions directed or supervised by others.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scope of Practice</td>
<td>N/A</td>
<td>Definable in enforceable legal terms; not reserved.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Applicable Criteria</td>
<td>Criteria 4, 5 and 6 must be met.</td>
<td>Criteria 1 through 6 must be met.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Assessment of the need for continued regulation

In its 2018 report, JLARC found several mandatory licensure programs previously established by the General Assembly “do not substantially meet the criteria Virginia has set for regulation,” including those restricting access to practice as a soil scientist, waste management facility operator, and landscape architect (see Table 2-2 from JLARC report below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2-2</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Some licensed occupations do not substantially meet criteria for regulation</td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation</th>
<th>Unregulated practice can harm public</th>
<th>Work is distinguishable from others</th>
<th>Public benefits from state assurance</th>
<th>Public is not protected by other means</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community managers 185 regulaants</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opticians 1,895 regulaants</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential energy analysts &amp; firms 127 regulaants</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soil scientists 102 regulaants</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waste mgmt. facility operators 670 regulaants</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landscape architects 925 regulaants</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
<td>○</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

KEY ○ = meets criteria ○ = partially meets criteria ○ = does not meet criteria

Noting the statutory proscription in § 54.1-100 against occupational regulation unless necessary for public protection, JLARC’s analysis concluded:

Three occupations pose some risk of harm, but regulation is not needed because the public is protected by other means so the risk is low (soil scientist); or regulation provides little added benefit (waste management facility operators); or regulation does not fully address the risk because much of the same work can be performed by unregulated occupations (landscape architects).

Although these three occupations “pose some potential for public harm if left unregulated,” because the risks appear minimal, JLARC recommended BPOR determine what level of regulation is warranted, if any.
Soil Scientists
According to JLARC’s analysis, regulation of soil scientists is unnecessary due to a low risk of public harm; although incompetent practice could negatively impact land use or land management, the report suggests potential harm is remote because many other regulated professionals are involved in such processes. Moreover, JLARC noted an existing private national certification is available to verify qualifications for soil scientists as an alternative to state regulation.

Virginia licensed professional soil scientists are defined in § 54.1-2200 as “a person who possesses the qualifications required for licensure by the provisions of this chapter and the regulations of the Board and who has been granted a license by the Board.” The practice of soil evaluation, as defined below, is restricted to licensed soil scientists4:

“... the evaluation of soil by accepted principles and methods including, but not limited to, observation, investigation, and consultation on measured, observed and inferred soils and their properties; analysis of the effects of these properties on the use and management of various kinds of soil; and preparation of soil descriptions, maps, reports and interpretive drawings.”

Initially, the legislature established the regulatory program governing soil scientists as a voluntary certification in 1989. During the 2011 Session of the General Assembly, the level of regulation increased to licensure with an effective date of July 1, 2013.

The Board for Soil Scientists, Wetland Professionals, and Geologists administers and enforces the regulatory program for soil scientists. As of November 1, 2020, Virginia regulated 90 licensed professional soil scientists,5 composing 7.6% of that board’s total regulant population.

Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

The unregulated practice of soil science presents a moderate risk of public harm. Potential hazards to public health, safety, or welfare are mitigated by the involvement of other experts to protect against ineffective land use or land management problems.

Public commenters provided examples of potential harm from incompetent practice such as detrimental repair costs to homeowners; contaminated water and dead vegetation; failure to identify suitable soils for their capacity of taking on and treating septic effluent; and inability to protect onsite and offsite environmental resources from erosion.

For instance, according to commenters, erosion and sediment control problems with the Mountain Valley Pipeline project may have resulted from a failure to conduct a proper soil survey by a licensed

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4 Subsection B.2 of § 54.1-2201 allows licensed professional engineers, landscape architects, and land surveyors to render soil evaluation services as part of their work.

5 In February 2011, when the General Assembly considered increasing the degree of regulation, Virginia regulated 136 certified soil scientists.
2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.
Public comment overwhelmingly supported continued licensure of soil scientists. Of 84 total comments received regarding soil scientists, 31% self-identified as non-practitioners.

The two commenters in opposition, one of whom self-identified as a licensee, cited among other reasons the size of the regulant population as being too small to warrant continued government regulation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation</th>
<th>82 (98%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation</td>
<td>2 (2%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Comments from Non-Practitioners in Support of Continued Regulation | 26 |
| Comments from Non-Practitioners Opposed to Continued Regulation | 0  |

3. The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed.
All 50 states regulate soil scientists to some degree. Virginia and eight other jurisdictions currently license soil scientists, and 41 states administer voluntary certification programs.

4. Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population.
A substantial portion of the population requires soil science services for a variety of public and private land development purposes such as erosion control, environmental impact studies, sludge management, mine reclamation, site restoration, ecological evaluations, waste application, and suitability studies for moisture retention or drainage.

The Soil Science Society of America offers national certification that could serve as an alternative to state regulation; in fact, the national certification exam is the same one used to qualify for Virginia’s existing soil scientist license. Additionally, licensed professional engineers, landscape architects, and land surveyors are authorized to engage in the practice of soil evaluation pursuant to subsection B.2 of § 54-2201.

If the profession is deregulated, substitutes may be available to meet demand. However, according to public comment, in at least one instance a locality would only accept work performed by a licensed soil scientist. (Acceptance of work by regulated substitutes could be addressed through guidance or clarifying legislation if necessary.)

5. Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession of each occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics.
Licensed professional soil scientists must comply with Standards of Practice and Conduct enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 145-20-160 et seq.).
The Soil Science Society of America (SSSA) requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics as a condition of national certification.

6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications.

Soil science is a specialized field and it is unreasonable to assume that consumers or the public would be able to select a qualified practitioner without assurance of minimum competency. Prospective employers of soil scientists to work in government or academic settings, however, likely have the ability to verify their competency.

7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.

SSSA requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics, which includes mandatory reporting by nationally certified individuals of certificate holders who have deviated from professional standards. In addition, SSSA-certified individuals must complete at least 30 continuing education units every two years as a condition of renewal (one of which must be in ethics).

The professional association also investigates complaints of potential violations and may impose sanctions including suspension or revocation of certification.6

8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.

In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against licensed soil scientists resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of licensure is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

The involvement of other licensed professionals, government and academic employers, and permitting authorities in the process associated with soil science practice may be adequate to mitigate risks to public health, safety, and welfare.

9. Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.

Although soil science is a specialized field, the risk of incompetent practice is mitigated by the involvement of other licensed professionals, government and academic employers, and permitting authorities in the process.

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10. Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.

Public- and private-sector entities often hire soil scientists to work on major land use or infrastructure projects, such as the construction and installation of oil and gas pipelines, which exposes the public to financial, environmental, and health hazards. However, the risk of incompetent practice is mitigated by the involvement of other licensed professionals, government and academic employers, and permitting authorities in the process.

Assessment

Certification appears to be the most appropriate, least-restrictive level of regulation for soil scientists.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>Moderate potential.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKILL + TRAINING</td>
<td>Specialized; differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>Variable; often collaborating with other licensed professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPE OF PRACTICE</td>
<td>Definable in enforceable legal terms; other licensed professionals allowed to practice under exemption.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The General Assembly may wish to consider reverting to the voluntary state certification (title protection) that existed prior to 2013, or relying entirely on the private national certification program.
Waste Management Facility Operators

JLARC found little added benefit associated with the licensing requirement for individuals who manage the daily operations of solid waste facilities; its report suggested public risks are adequately addressed by regulation of such facilities (e.g., landfills and transfer stations) by the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (DEQ). Additionally, JLARC noted the Board for Waste Management Facility Operators rarely meets due to a lack of business and that existing national certifications are available to verify qualifications for operators as an alternative to state regulation.

Waste management facility operators are defined in § 54.1-2209 as “any person, including an owner, who is in charge of the actual, on-site operation of a waste management facility during any period of operation.” Four distinct license classes are available depending on an individual’s demonstrated competency level. A waste management facility is defined by statute as “a site used for planned treatment, storage or disposal of nonhazardous solid waste.”

The General Assembly created the Board for Waste Management Facility Operators in 1991 and provided a two-year delayed effective date for the licensing requirement. The Board administers and enforces the regulatory program; establishes training criteria and approves training providers; and licenses qualified individuals.

As of November 1, 2020, Virginia licensed 652 waste management facility operators (100% of that board’s regulant population.)

Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

Waste management facility operators do not perform services for individuals and present low risk to the public if unregulated.

Potential hazards to public health, safety, or welfare from incompetent practice—including groundwater contamination, improper venting of landfill gases, or vermin infestation—are mitigated by strict oversight of the facilities by DEQ, the primary state agency responsible for protecting human health and the environment in this field.

2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.

Public comment received regarding waste management facility operators was unanimously supportive. All four commenters self-identified as non-practitioners.

| Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation | 4 (100%) |
| Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation | 0 (0%) |

| Comments from Non-Practitioners in Support of Continued Regulation | 4 |
| Comments from Non-Practitioners Opposed to Continued Regulation | 0 |
3. The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed. According to JLARC, 22 other states also regulate waste management facility operators, although some jurisdictions require operators to hold a national certification.

4. Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population. A substantial portion of the population requires waste management operator services. Waste management facilities are DEQ-regulated sites used for the planned treatment, storage, or disposal of non-hazardous solid waste.

If the profession is deregulated, substitutes appear available to meet demand. Alternatives to state regulation include the Solid Waste Association of North America (SWANA) Manager of Landfill Operations certification and the National Waste & Recycling Association (NWRA) Certified Landfill Manager certification.

5. Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession or occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics. Licensed waste management facility operators must comply with standards of practice and conduct enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 155-20-285).

Additionally, DEQ indirectly regulates the standards of public responsibility necessary to protect environmental and human health at waste management facilities.

6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications. Waste management facility operators do not provide direct services to consumers or the public, who likely would not be able to select a qualified practitioner without assurance of minimum competency. However, operators are employed by DEQ-regulated facilities whose owners can reasonably be expected to have the ability to verify competency.

7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation. SWANA requires certified Managers of Landfill Operations to complete 30 continuing education units every three years as a condition of renewal.

In addition, JLARC noted that potential risks presented by incompetent, unscrupulous, or irresponsible operators are adequately addressed by DEQ as the primary state agency responsible for protecting human health and the environment in this field.

8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate. In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against licensed waste management facility operators resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of
licensure is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

The current statutory and regulatory framework of DEQ oversight of waste management facilities appears adequate to protect public health, safety, and welfare.

9. **Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.**

Although waste management facility operation is a specialized field, strict regulation of waste management facilities by DEQ mitigates the relatively low risk of incompetent practice by operators.

10. **Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.**

Although waste management facility operators do not provide direct services to consumers, their work can expose the public to environmental and health hazards. However, the risk of incompetent practice by operators is low and mitigated by strict regulation of waste management facilities by DEQ.

**Assessment**

No level of occupational regulation appears warranted for waste management facility operators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>RISK</strong></th>
<th><strong>Low potential.</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>SKILL + TRAINING</strong></td>
<td>Specialized; differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AUTONOMY</strong></td>
<td>Variable; majority of practice actions supervised by DEQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SCOPE OF PRACTICE</strong></td>
<td>Definable in enforceable legal terms.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The General Assembly may wish to consider eliminating the licensing requirement and rely instead on existing DEQ oversight of waste management facilities. DEQ could require operators to obtain and maintain private-sector national certification as an alternative to state regulation.

If deregulated, existing licensees would be relieved of the regulatory obligation to complete eight hours of continuing education and pay a $50 fee every two years to renew their state credential.
Landscape Architects

In its report, JLARC acknowledged potential harm to the public from incompetent practice of landscape architecture; however, it concluded that licensure of landscape architects does not effectively address such risks because unregulated occupations (e.g., landscape designers, land planners) perform largely the same work and present the same potential dangers.

A landscape architect is defined in § 54.1-400 as follows:

“... a person who, by reason of his special knowledge of natural, physical and mathematical sciences, and the principles and methodology of landscape architecture and landscape architectural design acquired by professional education, practical experience, or both, is qualified to engage in the practice of landscape architecture and whose competence has been attested by the Board through licensure as a landscape architect.”

Statute further defines the practice of landscape architecture:

“... any service wherein the principles and methodology of landscape architecture are applied in consultation, evaluation, planning (including the preparation and filing of sketches, drawings, plans and specifications) and responsible supervision or administration of contracts relative to projects principally directed at the functional and aesthetic use of land.”

However, the law does not restrict the scope of practice only to licensed landscape architects who use that title.7 Subsection B of § 54.1-409 states:

Nothing contained herein or in the definition of "practice of landscape architecture" or in the definition of "landscape architect" in § 54.1-400 shall be construed to restrict or otherwise affect the right of any architect, professional engineer, land surveyor, nurseryman, landscape designer, landscape contractor, land planner, community planner, landscape gardener, golf course designer, turf maintenance specialist, irrigation designer, horticulturist, arborist, or any other similar person from engaging in their occupation or the practice of their profession or from rendering any service in connection therewith that is not otherwise proscribed.

Initially, the legislature created the regulatory program governing landscape architects as a voluntary certification in 1980. During the 2009 Session of the General Assembly, the level of regulation increased to licensure with an effective date of July 1, 2010.

The Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors, Certified Interior Designers, and Landscape Architects (APELSCIDLA) administers and enforces the regulatory program for landscape architects. As of November 1, 2020, Virginia regulated 937 landscape architects,8 composing 1.2% of that board’s regulant population.

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7 Subsection A of § 54.1-409 states, in part, “Beginning July 1, 2010, a person who engages in the practice of landscape architecture as defined in § 54.1-400 and who holds himself out as a landscape architect shall hold a valid license prior to engaging in such practice.” [emphasis added]

8 In February 2009, when the General Assembly considered increasing the degree of regulation, Virginia certified 820 landscape architects.
Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

The unregulated practice of landscape architecture presents significant risk of public harm. In addition to property damage and financial harm, incompetence may result in serious injury and even death. In a 2017 publication entitled Landscape Architecture Licensing Handbook, the American Society of Landscape Architects (ALSA) provided empirical examples of physical harm—not specific to Virginia—such as:

- Electrocution death from negligent outdoor lighting;
- Second- and third-degree burns from improperly placed lighting in outdoor shrubbery;
- Skull fractures, permanent loss of vision, quadriplegia, and death from obstructed views at intersections;
- Eye injury from an inappropriately placed thorny tree in apartment complex common area;
- Broken spine from 20-foot fall off “soft edge” of poorly designed recreational trail;
- Death after falling from parking lot designed without guardrail or fence to prevent drop-off;
- Fractured hip from trip-and-fall because of building threshold grading error; and
- Fatality linked to a fire ant attack from irrigation design defects that unevenly applied water and hampered pest control efforts.

As JLARC noted, however, Virginia’s existing regulatory program may not effectively address the risks because unregulated individuals are allowed to perform similar work.

2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.

Public comment unanimously supported continued licensure of landscape architects. Of 253 total comments received regarding landscape architects, 26% self-identified as non-practitioners, including affiliated design professionals who rely on the services licensed landscape architects provide.

| Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation | 253 (100%) |
| Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation | 0 (0%) |

| Comments from Non-Practitioners in Support of Continued Regulation | 65 |
| Comments from Non-Practitioners Opposed to Continued Regulation | 0 |

In addition, according to the Alliance for Responsible Professional Licensing (ARPL)—a consortium of national trade associations including the American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA) and the Council of Landscape Architectural Registration Boards (CLARB)—consumers overwhelmingly endorsed continued licensure for landscape architects and other “highly technical professions” in national opinion survey.  

9 See http://www.responsiblelicensing.org/fast-facts/
3. **The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed.**
Virginia and 46 other states—as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico—currently license landscape architects through regulation of practice and title. Maine and Massachusetts regulate landscape architects through title protection only.

Illinois sunset its title protection act for landscape architects effective January 1, 2020. Legislation to reinstate its regulatory program is pending as the Illinois General Assembly canceled its fall session due to COVID-19.

4. **Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population.**
A substantial portion of the population requires landscape architecture services for a variety of public and private land development purposes such as site plans, vehicular roadway and pedestrian system designs, storm water and erosion control plans, and siting of buildings and structures. Increased frequency of coastal flooding and the threat of sea level rise is likely to increase demand for their services.

If the profession is deregulated, there is no regulated substitute for landscape architects (although some practice overlap exists with other licensed design professionals such as architects and professional engineers).

5. **Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession of each occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics.**
Licensed landscape architects must comply with Standards of Practice and Conduct enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 10-20-690 et seq.).

The American Society of Landscape Architects (ASLA) requires adherence to its published [Code of Professional Ethics](https://www.asla.org/Professional%20Practice/Licensure/Code%20of%20Professional%20Ethics) for members. In addition, members must abide by ASLA’s [Code of Environmental Ethics](https://www.asla.org/Professional%20Practice/Licensure/Code%20of%20Environmental%20Ethics). (Membership in the professional association is optional; not every individual engaged in practice is obligated to join or follow the organization’s standards.)

6. **Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications.**

The practice of landscape architecture is highly specialized and requires practitioners to demonstrate minimum competency in areas including ecological systems; hydrology; land use and zoning; construction methods and building codes; accessibility standards; and federal, state, and local environmental laws.

It is unreasonable to assume that consumers or the public would be able to select a qualified practitioner without assurance of minimum competency. Public commenters also indicated that the design and construction industry that relies on the services of landscape architects is similarly ill equipped to evaluate their competency without the assurance licensure provides.¹⁰

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¹⁰ *See* [https://www.vaasla.org/VA-ASLA-Virginia-White-Paper/](https://www.vaasla.org/VA-ASLA-Virginia-White-Paper/)
7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.

ASLA requires adherence to its published Code of Professional Ethics, which includes mandatory reporting by members of violations by other members. The professional association also investigates complaints of potential violations and may impose sanctions including member suspension or expulsion.11

(Membership in the professional association is optional; not every individual engaged in practice is obligated to join or follow the organization’s standards.)

8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.

In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against licensed landscape architects resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of licensure is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

Building codes and inspections, local land use and zoning ordinances, and other licensed design professionals are likely inadequate to protect the public from incompetent landscape design practice. Additionally, as JLARC noted, the current regulatory framework may not be effective or adequate at addressing risk because unregulated occupations (e.g., landscape designers, land planners) can perform similar work and present the same potential dangers.

9. Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.

Although affiliated design professionals collaborate frequently, which mitigates the risk of incompetent practice, they do not possess the same specialized knowledge to evaluate the competency of landscape architects.

10. Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.

Whether landscape architects are designing a private residential project or working on a public-sector commercial site, their services affect the health, safety, and welfare of third parties who eventually use those spaces.

Assessment

Licensure appears to be the most appropriate, least-restrictive level of regulation for landscape architects.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>High potential.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKILL + TRAINING</td>
<td>Highly specialized education required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>Practices with some autonomy, though often collaborating with other licensed professionals.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

11 See ASLA’s Rules of Procedure for Filing and Resolution of a Complaint
To address concerns raised by JLARC about potential public harm presented by unregulated occupations performing largely the same services, the General Assembly may wish to consider reserving aspects of the scope of practice only to licensed professionals.
Assessment of potential impact of decertification

In its 2018 report, JLARC determined several currently voluntary certification programs established by the General Assembly and administered by DPOR are unnecessary (see Table 2-3 from JLARC report below).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 2-3</th>
<th>Some DPOR certifications are duplicative of national certifications</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National certification exists?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community manager employees</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>296 regulants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interior designers</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>491 regulants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Backflow prevention device workers</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1,377 regulants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural gas auto mechanics</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0 regulants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wetland delineators</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>114 regulants</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although its analysis suggested these occupations do not meet the statutory criteria for regulation, JLARC acknowledged that eliminating state certification may harm current certificate holders due to lack of uniformity and increased economic costs.

Therefore, before the General Assembly takes any action, JLARC recommended that BPOR review the need for continued state certification and evaluate potential impacts of deregulation on existing regulants.
Common Interest Community Manager Employees
According to JLARC’s analysis, regulation of community manager employees is unwarranted, overly burdensome, and completely duplicative of national certifications. The report noted:

For community manager employees, individuals with one of three nationally recognized credentials in community management automatically qualify for a state certificate. This equivalency means that the national and state certifications are essentially interchangeable.

In terms of potential harm, JLARC estimated the risk to be low because associations are already required to be bonded or insured against losses from theft or dishonesty by managers and their employees.

During the 2008 Session of the General Assembly, the legislature created the Common Interest Community Board to regulate common interest community (CIC) managers as well as their principal or supervisory employees. Pursuant to subsection C of § 54.1-2346, a prerequisite for CIC managers to obtain or renew licensure includes ensuring their covered employees, defined below, are properly certified:

“. . . all employees of the common interest community manager who have principal responsibility for management services provided to a common interest community or who have supervisory responsibility for employees who participate directly in the provision of management services to a common interest community shall, within two years after employment with the common interest community manager, hold a certificate issued by the Board certifying the person possesses the character and minimum skills to engage properly in the provision of management services to a common interest community or shall be under the direct supervision of a certified employee of such common interest community manager.”

As of November 1, 2020, Virginia regulated 306 CIC manager employees (also referred to as certified principal or supervisory employees), composing 64.6% of that board’s non-association regulant population.

Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

CIC manager employees present no risk to the public if unregulated. The harm they may present to association members from financial abuse or mismanagement is mitigated by statutory requirements for associations to maintain continuous bonding or insurance against losses from theft or dishonesty by managers and their employees.

2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.

Public comment overwhelmingly supported continued certification of CIC manager employees. Of 20 total comments received regarding CIC manager employees, 25% self-identified as non-practitioners who work with or rely on the services provided by certificate holders.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation</th>
<th>19 (95%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation</td>
<td>1 (5%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3. The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed. In addition to Virginia, seven other states regulate CIC managers or their employees to some extent. Colorado eliminated its licensing program for CIC managers effective June 30, 2019.

4. Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population. Although the portion of the population requiring services provided by CIC manager employees is unknown, substitutes are available to meet demand if the profession is deregulated.

The following national credentials currently qualify an individual for Virginia’s CIC manager employee certificate and could serve as an alternative to state regulation:

- Association Management Specialist (AMS)
- Certified Manager of Community Associations (CMCA)
- Professional Community Association Manager (PCAM)

5. Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession of each occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics. Certified CIC manager employees must comply with Standards of Conduct and Practice enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 48-50-140 et seq.). Community Associations Institute (CAI) requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics as a condition of national certification as an AMS or PCAM. The Community Association Managers International Certification Board (CAMICB) requires CMCA-certificate holders to comply with its Standards of Professional Conduct.

6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications. CIC manager employees provide services to associations, not consumers or the public. Because eligibility requirements for CAI and CAMICB credentials are equivalent to the entry standards for state certification, management companies and association governing boards can rely on the national designations to provide assurance of minimum competency.

In addition, potential harm to association members from financial abuse or mismanagement is mitigated by statutory requirements for associations to maintain continuous bonding or insurance to protect against losses from theft or dishonesty by managers and their employees.
7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.

CAI and CAMICB require adherence to published codes of conduct, which include mandatory reporting by certified individuals of other certificate holders who have deviated from professional standards. In addition, CAI-certified individuals must complete continuing education every three years as a condition of renewal.

The professional associations also investigate complaints of potential violations and may impose sanctions including suspension or revocation of certification.12

8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.

In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against CIC manager employees resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of certification is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

Statutory requirements for associations and licensed CIC managers to maintain continuous bonding or insurance to protect against losses from employee theft or dishonesty appear adequate to mitigate risks of harm.

9. Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.

Statutory requirements for bonding or insurance to protect against losses from employee theft or dishonesty mitigate risk of incompetent practice by CIC Manager Employees, who do not provide direct services to consumers or the public.

10. Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.

Although CIC manager employees do not provide direct services to consumers or the public, their work can expose owners in common interest communities to potential harm. However, the risk of incompetent practice is mitigated by statutory requirements for associations to maintain continuous bonding or insurance against losses from employee theft or dishonesty.

Assessment
No level of occupational regulation appears warranted for CIC manager employees.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>N/A</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKILL + TRAINING</td>
<td>Specialized; differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

AUTONOMY | Variable; majority of practice actions directed or supervised by licensed CIC Manager.
SCOPE OF PRACTICE | Definable in enforceable legal terms.

The General Assembly may wish to consider eliminating the certification requirement and rely instead on statutory requirements for associations to maintain continuous bonding or insurance against losses from employee theft or dishonesty.

If deregulated, existing certificate holders would be relieved of the obligation to pay a $75 fee every two years to renew their state credential. Individuals who qualified for their Virginia certificate based on holding a national designation from CAI or CAMICB could maintain their private certification.

AMS Certification requires an annual maintenance fee of $85 for CAI members and $310 for non-members. To recertify, AMS certificate holders must complete one CAI course and eight hours of other industry-related continuing education every three years to recertify.

PCAM Certification requires an annual maintenance fee of $160 for CAI members and $385 for non-members. To recertify, PCAM certificate holders must complete 12 hours of continuing education every three years to re-designate.

CMCA Certification from CAMICB requires an annual service fee of $115. To recertify, CMCA certificate holders must complete 16 hours of continuing education every two years.
Interior Designers

In its report, JLARC determined the requirements for national and state certification of interior designers are nearly identical. It concluded that continued regulation appears unnecessary and “offers no additional assurance of competency for this occupation.”

Certified interior designers are defined in § 54.1-400 as “a design professional who meets the criteria of education, experience, and testing in the rendering of interior design services established by the Board through certification as an interior designer.”

Statute further defines interior design by a certified interior designer as:

“. . . any service rendered wherein the principles and methodology of interior design are applied in connection with the identification, research, and creative solution of problems pertaining to the function and quality of the interior environment. Such services relative to interior spaces shall include the preparation of documents for non load-bearing interior construction, furnishings, fixtures, and equipment in order to enhance and protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public.”

The title protection law—enacted during the 1990 Session of the General Assembly—does not restrict the scope of practice and serves as the framework for the voluntary certification program. While only state-certified interior designers may use the title, any individual may render services as an interior designer, interior decorator, or similar.

The Board for Architects, Professional Engineers, Land Surveyors, Certified Interior Designers, and Landscape Architects (APELSCIDLA) administers and enforces the regulatory program for certified interior designers. As of November 1, 2020, Virginia regulated 487 certified interior designers, composing 1.2% of that board’s regulant population.

Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

The unregulated practice of interior design presents at least a moderate risk of public harm. The involvement of other regulated design professionals or building codes and inspections may not be sufficient to mitigate potential hazards to public health, safety, and welfare.

Although interior designers can perform residential work, many focus on public spaces such as hospitals, schools, nursing homes, government facilities, and office buildings. Minimally competent interior design services protect the public by:

- Ensuring safe evacuation from interior spaces in emergency situations, by planning clear circulation paths that lead to building exits;
- Minimizing fire and toxic smoke hazards, through knowledge of fire ratings and material properties for different types of interior spaces;
- Reducing accidental injuries due to falls, by applying technical knowledge of friction coefficient, a factor in slip resistance, for high-traffic areas such as public building entrances and lobbies; and
• Specifying proper lighting fixtures, to ensure ability to see transitions in floor levels, read directional signage, and impart overall feeling of safety.

For example, the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) emphasized services offered by interior designers—egress management, occupant flow, partition placement, and seating arrangements—as areas of particular importance for building owners and facility managers reopening under COVID-19 safety protocols in its Fire and Life Safety Checklist.

2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.

Public comment overwhelmingly supported continued certification of interior designers. Of 419 total comments received regarding interior designers, 27% self-identified as non-practitioners.

Among the non-practitioners, 57 volunteered that they work with or rely on the services provided by certified interior designers. (The other non-practitioner respondents did not specify their relationship to the profession.)

| Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation | 418 (99.8%) |
| Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation   | 1 (0.2%) |
| Comments from Non-Practitioners in Support of Continued Regulation | 113 |
| Comments from Non-Practitioners Opposed to Continued Regulation | 0 |

3. The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed.

Three states (Florida, Louisiana, and Nevada)—as well as the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico—license interior designers through regulation of practice and title. Virginia and 23 other states certify interior designers through title protection only.

The profession is unregulated in the remaining 23 states.

4. Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population.

A substantial portion of the population requires interior design services provided through public and private contracts for construction or renovation at hospitals, schools, nursing homes, office buildings, and government facilities.

The National Council for Interior Design Qualification (NCIDQ) offers certification that could serve as an alternative to state regulation; in fact, the NCIDQ exam is the same one used to qualify for Virginia’s existing interior design certification.

If the profession is deregulated, national certification appears adequate to meet demand. According to the NCIDQ online searchable database, there are at least 500 active NCIDQ certificate holders in Virginia.13

5. Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession of each occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics.

Certified interior designers must comply with Standards of Practice and Conduct enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 10-20-690 et seq.).

NCIDQ requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics for certificate holders.

The American Society of Interior Designers (ASID) requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct for members. (Membership in the professional association is optional; not every individual engaged in practice is obligated to join or follow the organization’s standards.)

6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications.

The practice of interior design is specialized and requires practitioners to demonstrate competency in areas including fire, life-safety, building, and energy codes; space planning and wayfinding; interior building materials, finishes, furnishings, and equipment; lighting and acoustics; accessibility standards; ergonomics and anthropometrics; and human environmental behavior.

It is unlikely that consumers or the public would be able to select a qualified practitioner without some assurance of minimum competency. However, because eligibility requirements for NCIDQ Certification are nearly identical to the entry standards for Virginia’s interior design credential, the private designation appears to provide sufficient assurance of minimum competency.

7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.

NCIDQ certificate holders must complete six hours of continuing education every two years. However, NCIDQ does not appear to have a clear policy or process for reporting, investigating, or sanctioning incompetent practice by individuals who are nationally certified.

ASID requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics and Professional Conduct, which includes mandatory reporting by members of violations by other members. In addition, ASID members must complete 10 hours of continuing education every two years as a condition of renewal. ASID investigates complaints of potential violations and may impose sanctions including suspension or termination of membership.14

(Membership in ASID is optional; not every individual engaged in practice is obligated to join or follow the organization’s standards.)

14 See https://www.asid.org/resources/about/ethics/file-a-complaint
8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.

In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against certified interior designers resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of certification is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

The involvement of other regulated design professionals or building codes and inspections may not be adequate to mitigate potential hazards to public health, safety, and welfare. For instance, public commenters noted that incremental interior changes over the life of a public space—e.g., reconfiguration of open office and systems furniture, replacement of finishes such as wallcovering and flooring, moveable modular wall panels—generally do not require such oversight but often introduce potential hazards.

9. Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.

Interior design is a specialized field. The involvement of other regulated design professionals or building codes and inspections may not be sufficient to mitigate potential hazards to public health, safety, and welfare.

10. Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.

Whether certified interior designers are working on a private residential project or a public-sector commercial site, their services affect the health, safety, and welfare of third parties (e.g., patients, students, visitors, employees) who eventually use those spaces.

Assessment

Certification appears to be the most appropriate, least-restrictive level of regulation for interior designers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>Moderate potential.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKILL + TRAINING</td>
<td>Specialized; differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>Practices with some autonomy, though often collaborating with other licensed professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPE OF PRACTICE</td>
<td>Definable in enforceable legal terms; title protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The General Assembly may wish to consider the following potential impacts on current certificate holders before taking action on JLARC’s recommendation to eliminate state certification and instead rely on NCIDQ national certification as an alternative.

If deregulated, current certified interior designers would be relieved of the obligation to pay a $45 fee every two years to renew their state credential. Individuals who choose to maintain NCIDQ Certification as an alternative would pay $75 annually to the national association and complete six hours of continuing education every two years.
Public commenters expressed concern that deregulation could result in significant economic disruption for current certificate holders because certified interior designers would lose autonomy to practice without oversight from a licensed design professional. Interior designers would need to hire consulting architects or professional engineers to stamp their work, at increased cost to their businesses and clients.

Commenters also indicated that deregulation might unfairly exclude current certified interior designers from competition for federal, state, and local contracts that often require work be completed by regulated professionals. For instance, the standard U.S. General Services Administration (GSA) form used to report qualifications for key personnel on proposed federal contracts requires “information on current relevant professional registration(s) in a State or possession of the United States, Puerto Rico, or the District of Columbia according to FAR Part 36.”

However, if the Virginia certification program is eliminated, Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 36.609-4(b) allows solicitations to omit the designer registration requirement, “when the design will be performed in a State or outlying area of the United States that does not have registration requirements for the particular field involved.”

15 See https://www.acquisition.gov/far/part-36#FAR_36_609_4
Backflow Prevention Device Workers

JLARC’s analysis concluded the regulatory program for backflow prevention device workers is unnecessary and “largely duplicative of national and local training certifications.” Its report cited the establishment of a uniform credential for recognition across localities as a primary rationale for requiring state certification; however, occupational recognition is not one of the statutory criteria for regulation.

A backflow prevention device worker is defined in § 54.1-1128 as follows:

“...any individual who engages in, or offers to engage in, the maintenance, repair, testing, or periodic inspection of cross connection control devices, including but not limited to reduced pressure principle backflow preventors, double check-valve assemblies, double-detector check-valve assemblies, pressure type vacuum breaker assemblies, and other such devices designed, installed, and maintained in such a manner so as to prevent the contamination of the potable water supply by the introduction of non-potable liquids, solids, or gases, thus ensuring that the potable water supply remains unaltered and free from impurities, odor, discoloration, bacteria, and other contaminants which would make the potable water supply unfit or unsafe for consumption and use.”

During the 1996 Session of the General Assembly, the legislature transferred regulation of backflow prevention device workers from localities to DPOR, with a delayed implementation date of July 1, 1998. Localities are required to accept state certification as proof of minimum competency, but may impose restrictions on uncertified backflow prevention device workers.

The Board for Contractors administers and enforces the regulatory program for backflow prevention device workers; approves training providers; and certifies qualified individuals. As of November 1, 2020, Virginia certified 1,471 backflow prevention device workers; composing 1.7% of that board’s regulant population.

Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

Backflow prevention device workers perform a service with the potential for significant public harm because incompetent practice can result in the contamination of our water supply.

Building codes and inspections alone are likely inadequate to protect the public from the risks of incompetence practice.

2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.

Public comment unanimously supported continued certification of backflow prevention device workers. Of 78 total comments received regarding backflow prevention device workers, 38% self-identified as non-practitioners, many representing local governments and utility providers that rely on the services provided by certificate holders.

Among the commenters advocating for continued state regulation:

- Augusta County Service Authority


- City of Chesapeake
- Chesterfield County Buildings and Grounds
- Fairfax County Land Development Services
- Hampton Roads Planning District Commission
- Henrico County Public Utilities
- Isle of Wight County Utility Services
- James City Service Authority
- Lynchburg Water Resources
- Newport News Waterworks Department

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation</th>
<th>78 (100%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Comments from Non-Practitioners in Support of Continued Regulation | 30 |
|Comments from Non-Practitioners Opposed to Continued Regulation   | 0  |

3. **The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed.**

All 50 states regulate the services provided by backflow prevention device workers to some degree. Approaches vary widely, ranging from state-administered licensure programs to private-sector certification required at the local level.

4. **Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population.**

A substantial portion of the population requires the services provided by backflow prevention device workers to prevent contamination of our water supply.

Licensed plumbers and HVAC tradesmen are also qualified to perform the work; however, it is unlikely an adequate supply of those tradesmen would be available to meet demand given existing shortages in those fields. If the profession is deregulated, a variety of private third-party credentials could serve as alternatives to state regulation.

5. **Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession of each occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics.**

Certified backflow prevention device workers must comply with Standards of Conduct enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 50-30-185).

By its nature, the occupation demands high standards of performance and public responsibility because backflow prevention device workers are entrusted to keep our water supply safe for consumption and use.
6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications.

Backflow prevention is a specialized trade. It is unreasonable to assume that consumers or the public would be able to select a qualified practitioner without assurance of minimum competency. Local governments and utility providers that employ backflow prevention device workers, however, likely have the ability to verify their competency.

7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.

Several associations offering certifications for backflow prevention device workers require refresher courses, re-examination, or continuing education as a condition of renewal.

(Membership in a professional association is optional; not every individual engaged in practice is obligated to join or follow the organization’s standards.)

8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.

In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against certified backflow prevention device workers resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of certification is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

Building codes and inspections alone are inadequate to protect the public from the significant risks of incompetence practice.

9. Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.

Backflow prevention is a specialized trade. Building codes and inspections alone are not sufficient to protect the public from the significant risks of incompetence practice.

10. Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.

The services provided by backflow prevention device workers, if performed incompetently, risk contaminating the water supply and making it unfit or unsafe for consumption and use by third parties.

**Assessment**

Certification appears to be the most appropriate, least-restrictive level of regulation for backflow prevention device workers.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>High potential.</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKILL + TRAINING</td>
<td>Specialized; differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
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<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>Variable; majority of practice actions directed or supervised by others.</td>
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</table>
The General Assembly may wish to consider the following potential impacts on current certificate holders before taking action on JLARC’s recommendation to eliminate state certification and instead rely on national or local certifications as alternatives.

If deregulated, current certified backflow prevention device workers would be relieved of the obligation to complete eight hours of continuing education\footnote{Certificate holders in their first two-year renewal cycle are exempt from the continuing education requirement (18 VAC 155-20-160.D).} and pay a $50 fee every two years to renew their state credential.

However, deregulation may significantly increase the compliance burden on current certificate holders, particularly for those who work in more than one locality if those jurisdictions require different credentials. Depending on the particular training program an individual completed to obtain state certification, they may not qualify automatically for whatever private credential a locality might require.

For instance, if a current certified backflow prevention device worker does not already have a credential from the American Society of Sanitary Engineering (ASSE), in order to obtain ASSE Backflow Prevention Assembly Tester certification he will need to:

- Complete the ASSE-approved training course (ranging from $800-1000);
- Pass written and practical end-of-course exams; and
- Pay $85 membership fee to ASSE.

Recertification is required every three years to maintain ASSE certification, by completing an approved refresher course (ranging from $375-525) and passing written and practical end-of-course.

Finally, deregulation conflicts with an in-process Virginia Department of Health regulatory action to amend its Waterworks Regulations. The proposed action, now at the final stage, would mandate that anyone who tests and repairs backflow prevention assemblies and devices be a DPOR-certified backflow prevention device worker (effective January 1, 2022).
Wetland Delineators

JLARC determined the Virginia regulatory program for wetland delineators is unnecessary because national certification is available as a professional wetland scientist. However, although existing Virginia certificate holders likely qualify for the national certification, the third-party credential is not equivalent and may not offer the same public protection.

A Virginia certified professional wetland delineator is defined in § 54.1-2200 as “a person who possesses the qualifications required for certification by the provisions of this chapter and the regulations of the Board and who is granted certification by the Board.” By comparison, non-certified wetland professionals are defined as “having special knowledge of wetland science and the methods and principles of wetland delineation17 as acquired by education and experience in the formation, description and mapping of wetlands.”

Statute further defines the practice of wetland delineation as:

“... the delineation of wetlands by accepted principles and methods including, but not limited to, observation, investigation, and consultation on soil, vegetation, and hydrologic parameters; and preparation of wetland delineations, descriptions, reports and interpretive drawings.”

The title protection law—enacted during the 2002 Session of the General Assembly with a two-year delayed effective date—does not restrict the scope of practice and serves as the framework for the voluntary certification program. While only certified professional wetland delineators may use the title, any individual may practice wetland delineation as a wetland professional.

The Board for Soil Scientists, Wetland Professionals, and Geologists administers and enforces the regulatory program. As of November 1, 2020, Virginia regulated 116 certified professional wetland delineators, composing 9.9% of that board’s regulant population.

Application of Criteria

1. Whether the practitioner, if unregulated, performs a service for individuals involving a hazard to the public health, safety or welfare.

The unregulated practice of wetland delineation presents a low risk of public harm. Potential hazards to public health, safety, or welfare are mitigated by the involvement of other regulated design professionals, permitting authorities, and regulatory agencies.

According to public commenters, the tangible public harm that initially led to creation of Virginia’s landmark certification program—the first in the nation—were permitting problems and lawsuits against regulatory authorities resulting from unqualified individuals performing wetland delineations in the 1990s.

17 Wetland delineation means “delineating wetland limits in accordance with prevailing state and federal regulatory guidance and describing wetland types” (§ 54.1-2200).
2. The opinion of a substantial portion of the people who do not practice the particular profession, trade or occupation on the need for regulation.

Public comment unanimously supported continued certification of wetland delineators. Of 142 total comments received regarding wetland delineators, 56% self-identified as non-practitioners.

Among the non-practitioners, 38 volunteered that they are industry partners who work with or rely on the services provided by certified professional wetland delineators. (The other non-practitioner respondents did not specify their relationship to the profession.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Total Comments in Support of Continued Regulation</th>
<th>142 (100%)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Comments Opposed to Continued Regulation</td>
<td>0 (0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments from Non-Practitioners in Support of Continued Regulation</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Comments from Non-Practitioners Opposed to Continued Regulation</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Industry partners advocating for continued state certification cited the importance of wetland delineators assisting with permitting processes and possessing knowledge of Virginia-specific tidal and wetland ecology, a competency not required by the national credential.

3. The number of states which have regulatory provisions similar to those proposed.

Three other states (Minnesota, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin) also certify wetland delineators. No states license the practice of wetland delineation.

4. Whether there is sufficient demand for the service for which there is no regulated substitute and this service is required by a substantial portion of the population.

Landowners and developers hire wetland delineators to identify the location and physical limits of wetlands; assess functions and values; assist with regulatory issues and permits; and advise on mitigation planning. Regulatory agencies often also engage their services for third-party review.

Public commenters indicated that demand for wetland delineators is increasing due to the dynamic composition of wetlands, sea level rise, and the redefinition of “adjacent wetlands” under the Navigable Waters Protection Rule. According to DEQ, the recent EPA action does not replace or supersede state authority for permitting impacts to state waters. Therefore, Virginia may require more qualified practitioners for permitting activities affecting wetlands in Virginia that are no longer regulated by the federal government.

If the profession is deregulated, there is no equivalent regulated substitute. The Society of Wetland Scientists offers national certification as a Professional Wetland Scientist (PWS) that could serve as an alternative. However, public commenters emphasized that the national credential is inadequate to meet the demand for services provided by qualified wetland delineators who possess knowledge of Virginia-specific tidal and wetland ecology.

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18 See https://www.epa.gov/nwpr
19 See https://www.deq.virginia.gov/Programs/Water/WetlandsStreams/Regulations.aspx
specific tidal and wetland ecology. The state certification exam also covers local and state regulations, crucial competencies not covered by any national credential.

5. Whether the profession or occupation requires high standards of public responsibility, character, and performance of each individual engaged in the profession of each occupation, as evidenced by established and published codes of ethics. Certified professional wetland delineators must comply with Standards of Practice and Conduct enumerated in board regulations (18 VAC 145-30-140 et seq.).

The Society of Wetland Scientists requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics as a condition of national certification.

6. Whether the profession or occupation requires such skill that the public generally is not qualified to select a competent practitioner without some assurance that they have met minimum qualifications.

The practice of wetland delineators is specialized. Certified professional wetland delineators must demonstrate minimum competency in four distinct areas: botany, soil science, hydrology, and state-specific tidal wetland definition. It is unreasonable to assume that consumers or the public would be able to select a qualified practitioner without assurance of minimum competency.

Eligibility requirements for PWS Certification appear to provide sufficient assurance of minimum competency in wetland science generally, though not wetland delineation in particular nor practice specific to Virginia.

7. Whether the professional or occupational associations do not adequately protect the public from incompetent, unscrupulous or irresponsible members of the profession or occupation.

The Society of Wetland Scientists requires adherence to its published Code of Ethics, which includes mandatory reporting by PWS certificate holders of violations by other nationally certified individuals. In addition, PWS certificate holders must complete continuing education every five years as a condition of renewal.

The professional association also investigates complaints of potential violations and may impose sanctions including probation or decertification.\(^\text{20}\)

8. Whether current laws which pertain to public health, safety and welfare generally are ineffective or inadequate.

In the last five fiscal years, DPOR has received no complaints against certified professional wetland delineators resulting in disciplinary action. That data may indicate the existing regulatory system of certification is effectively protecting the public; alternatively, no enforcement activity may reflect low overall risk associated with the occupation.

The involvement of regulatory agencies, permitting authorities, and licensed professionals who collaborate with wetland professionals may be adequate to mitigate risks to public health, safety, and

\(^{20}\) See [https://www.wetlandcert.org/docs/EthicsComplaintForm.pdf](https://www.wetlandcert.org/docs/EthicsComplaintForm.pdf)
welfare. According to public commenters, inspection and private civil action alone proved insufficient in the 1990s to protect against permitting problems resulting from incompetent practice.

9. **Whether the characteristics of the profession or occupation make it impractical or impossible to prohibit those practices of the profession or occupation which are detrimental to the public health, safety and welfare.**

Wetland delineation is a specialized field. The involvement of regulatory agencies, permitting authorities, and licensed professionals who collaborate with wetland professionals may be adequate to mitigate risks to public health, safety, and welfare.

10. **Whether the practitioner performs a service for others which may have a detrimental effect on third parties relying on the expert knowledge of the practitioner.**

Public- and private-sector entities hire wetland delineators to work on land use and infrastructure projects, so incompetent practice may expose the public to financial risk and jeopardize environmental resources.

**Assessment**

Certification appears to be the most appropriate, least-restrictive level of regulation for wetland delineators.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>RISK</th>
<th>Low potential</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SKILL + TRAINING</td>
<td>Specialized; differentiated from ordinary work. Candidate must complete specific education or experience requirements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUTONOMY</td>
<td>Variable; often collaborating with other licensed professionals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCOPE OF PRACTICE</td>
<td>Definable in enforceable legal terms; title protection.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The General Assembly may wish to consider the following potential impacts on current certificate holders before taking action on JLARC’s recommendation to eliminate state certification of professional wetland delineators and instead rely on national certification as an alternative.

If deregulated, current certified professional wetland delineators would be relieved of the obligation to pay a $70 fee every two years to renew their state credential as a certified professional wetland delineator.

Individuals who pursue national certification as an alternative would apply for Professional Wetland Scientist (PWS) designation by submitting a $400 fee to the Society of Wetland Scientists; providing academic transcripts and professional references; and documenting their experience and publications in the area of wetland science. Maintenance of PWS certification requires a $75 annual maintenance fee; individuals must renew every five years by paying a $100 recertification fee and satisfying continuing education requirements.

Although existing Virginia certificate holders likely qualify for the national certification, the third-party credential is not equivalent and may not offer the same public protection.